Panama Odyssey by William J. Jorden

Author:William J. Jorden [Jorden, William J.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: University of Texas Press
Published: 1984-12-15T00:00:00+00:00

CHAPTER 15

Generous, Fair, and Appropriate

“It may be that these proposals will be less than you had expected or wished . . . In my best judgement, the proposals will be generous, fair, and appropriate.”

—President Jimmy Carter, letter to General Torrijos, July 29, 1977

IN the austere, colorless conference room on the seventh floor of the Department of State, there was no physical evidence in mid-May 1977 that it was the joyful month. The sun could not invade the windowless chamber, and not even a vase of flowers broke the brown-and-beige monotony. Nonetheless, a spirit of optimism and good cheer was palpable as the American and Panamanian treaty negotiators gathered there for the fifth meeting of the May Round.

The warm-up games were behind them and the real season was about to begin for both teams. At that May 19 meeting, the two sides put the finishing touches to the Neutrality Treaty, and as they neared the end of their work that afternoon, Panamanian negotiator Rómulo Escobar said: “Well, gentlemen, as we said at the beginning, we sincerely believe that we have taken a major step forward. It has not been easy. But I think that this is the way we should proceed.”

That same day, a supplementary negotiating forum began to emerge. It was an exclusive club of two, my colleague Gabriel Lewis and me. Ambassadors Bunker and Linowitz told me that my intervention the week before had been crucial and they wanted me to continue working closely with Gabriel. They recognized that our moving aggressively on territorial questions had opened the way to the Neutrality Treaty. They believed similar behind-the-scenes diplomacy could be useful on other matters.

The same thought occurred to the Panamanians. Escobar, Royo, and Fábrega recognized that Gabriel had played a decisive role in breaking the logjam at the beginning of the May Round. They, too, concluded that continuation of the Lewis-Jorden channel could benefit both sides. They discussed it with General Torrijos and he endorsed the idea. It had the kind of conspiratorial touch that Torrijos relished. Not that there was any secrecy within the negotiating teams themselves. But there was just enough of an unorthodox, sub rosa, informal aspect to this approach to give it great appeal to a man who used precisely those techniques in his own political maneuvers.

Gabriel and I developed a work plan that day on a flight to Houston. Panama’s President Lakas was in the bustling oil capital for his annual physical checkup, and the ambassador and I flew down to brief him on the latest negotiating developments. On the trip down and back, we talked at length about how we could best support the main negotiating effort.

We agreed quickly on a list of things we would not do. Clearly it was not our job to negotiate agreements. We would not try to pin each other down to any specific commitments. We would never have an agenda. And we would never lie to each other. If there were things we could not discuss at any given moment, we would say so and put it off to another day.

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